Self-determination There are a number of terms that, in common with 'rationality', suggest that people should not be unthinking adherents of a code of conduct or of opinions and beliefs laid down by others. Examples of such terms are 'individuality', 'independence', 'self-determination', and 'self-direction'. These terms themselves may well not be synonymous but they have in common with each other the idea that what the individual does or thinks should be decided by himself. And this is so whether the notion of 'self is explicit as in 'self-direction' or implicit as in 'individuality'. 2 Self-determination involves the notion of thinking in the sense of reflecting, calculating, memorizing, predicting, judging, and deciding. This is not to say that determined behavior has to be entirely dictated by reason, and that emotions and feelings can play no part in it. A man might be said to be self-determining even though he acts in a certain way largely as a result of some desire. But he can only be said to be self-determining if his reason is also involved to some extent. If he simply responds automatically and directly to his desires, so that there is no attempt at conscious planning or decision taking involved in his behavior, it is difficult to see how one could regard him as determining his action in any sense at all. Provided however that his reason is involved to the extent of attempting to decide between conflicting desires, attempting to consider suitable means of achieving ends that may be dictated by his desires, and so on, it seems reasonable to regard his behavior as determined. 3A man might be self-determining and either rational or irrational. Conversely a man might be rational and yet not self-determining, at least in respect of his actions, simply because he is not free to do as he decides. It is a necessary condition of a person's being self-determining that he should be free to act as he chooses, but this freedom is not a necessary condition of a person's being rational. To advocate rationality as an ideal is to advocate that people should have a certain attitude and certain standards of reasoning. To have this ideal does not in itself commit one to any particular view about the extent to which people should be free from subject to rules. If one favors rationality as an aim then one will not favor situations in which people behave in certain ways simply because they have been told to do so by some authority figure. But the reason one will object to this state of affairs is that in itself the fact that somebody says 'do this' is not a good reason for doing this. There may none the less be very good reasons for doing what the authority figure demands and therefore one's commitment to rationality certainly does not commit one to the view that people ought not to abide by various rules and dictates from people in authoritative positions. It may sometimes commit one to the view that people positively ought to abide by such rules - if, that is to say, there is felt to be good reason for abiding by the rules in question. In practice if people are to be encouraged to be rational then they will want to assess for themselves the arguments and dictates of others, and they will accept them or reject them in the light of their own reasoning. And therefore, given the undoubted difficulty of judging who is being more or less rational in particular situations, occasions will arise on which people will wish to reject the pronouncements of authority. There would be something suspect about claiming to be committed to rationality as an aim, and refusing to allow anybody any freedom to reject the status
