Question

Suppose that there are two types of cars, good and bad. The qualities of cars are not observable but are known to the sellers. Risk-neutral buyers and sellers have their own valuation of these two types of cars
Types of Cars Buyers Valuation Seller Valuation
Good (50% probability) 5,000 4,500
Bad ( 50% probability) 3,000 2.500
When a buyer does not observe the quality, what is the highest price she will offer for a used car if she ignores adverse selection?
A. $2,500
B. $3,000
C. $4,000
D. $4,500

Answer 1

Answer:

C. $4,000

Explanation:

If he buyer does not have complete information about the car's quality, he/she will likely offer the expected value for a car = ($3,000 x 50%) + ($5,000 x 50%) = $4,000 car. In this type of scenarios, sellers of lemons (bad cars) are benefited since they are able to get a higher price, but sellers of goods cars are hurt because buyers assume their cars are bad.