The question contains a description of four experiments we performed before.
1. For each of the three experiments, formulate the extensive form game.
2. Find the Nash equilibrium and the subgame perfect equilibrium for each experiment
Experiment 1:ultimatum overview
paired into groups of two; one is the Proposer, the other the Responder
Proposer proposes how to divide $100.
Responder chooses either Accept or Reject
if Accept, then earnings determined by accepted proposal
if Reject, then both players earn $0
Experiment 2: split the pie overview
paired into groups of two; one is randomly selected to be Divider
divider chooses how to divide $100
payoffs are determined by this choice
Experiment 3: an investment game overview
groups of two: Investor and Responder
each starts with $100
Investor chooses how much to send to Responder (the investment)
Responder gets investment × multiplier (3)
Responder chooses how much money to return to Investor
